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Abstract
First-order Go¨del logics are a family of infinite-valued logics where the sets of
truth values V are closed subsets of [0,1] containing both 0 and 1. Different such
sets V in general determine different Go¨del logics GV (sets of those formulas which
evaluate to 1 in every interpretation into V ). It is shown that GV is axiomatizable
iff V is finite, V is uncountable with 0 isolated in V , or every neighborhood of 0 in
V is uncountable. Complete axiomatizations for each of these cases are given. The
r.e. prenex, negation-free, and existential fragments of all first-order Go¨del logics
are also characterized.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The logics we investigate in this paper, first-order Go¨del logics, can be characterized
in a rough-and-ready way as follows: The language is a standard first-order language.
The logics are many-valued, and the sets of truth values considered are closed subsets
of [0,1] which contain both 0 and 1. 1 is the “designated value,” i.e., a formula is valid
if it receives the value 1 in every interpretation. The truth functions of conjunction
and disjunction are minimum and maximum, respectively, and quantifiers are defined
by infimum and supremum over subsets of the set of truth values. The characteristic
operator of Go¨del logics, the Go¨del conditional, is defined by a → b = 1 if a ≤ b and
= b if a > b. Because the truth values are ordered (indeed, in many cases, densely
ordered), the semantics of Go¨del logics is suitable for formalization of comparisons.
It is related in this respect to a more widely known many-valued logic, Łukasiewicz
(or “fuzzy”) logic—yet the truth function of the Łukasiewicz conditional is defined not
just using comparison, but also addition. In contrast to Łukasiewicz logic, which might
be considered a logic of absolute or metric comparison, Go¨del logics are logics of
relative comparison. This alone makes Go¨del logics an interesting subject for logical
investigations.
There are other reasons why the study of Go¨del logics is important. As noted, Go¨del
logics are related to other many-valued logics of recognized importance. Indeed, Go¨del
logic is one of the three basic t-norm based logics which have received increasing
attention in the last 15 or so years [Ha´j98] (the others are Łukasiewicz and product
logic). Yet Go¨del logic is also closely related to intuitionistic logic: it is the logic
of linearly-ordered Heyting algebras. In the propositional case, infinite-valued Go¨del
logic can be axiomatized by the intuitionistic propositional calculus extended by the
axiom schema (A → B)∨ (B → A). This connection extends also to Kripke semantics
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for intuitionistic logic: Go¨del logics can also be characterized as logics of (classes of)
linearly ordered and countable intuitionistic Kripke structures with constant domains
[BP].
One of the surprising facts about Go¨del logics is that whereas there is only one
infinite-valued propositional Go¨del logic, there are infinitely many different infinite-
valued first-order Go¨del logics depending on the choice of the set of truth values. This
is also the case when one considers the propositional consequence relation, and like-
wise when the language is extended to include quantification over propositions. For
both quantified propositional and first-order Go¨del logics, different sets of truth val-
ues with different order-theoretic properties result in different sets of valid formulas.
Hence it is necessary to consider truth value sets other than the standard unit interval.
In the light of the result of Scarpellini [Sca62] on non-axiomatizability of infinite-
valued first-order Łukasiewicz logic which can be extended to almost all linearly or-
dered infinite-valued logics, it is also surprising that some infinite-valued Go¨del logics
are recursively enumerable. Our main aim in this paper is to characterize those sets
of truth values which give rise to axiomatizable Go¨del logics, and those whose sets of
validities are not r.e. We show that a set V of truth values determines an axiomatizable
first-order Go¨del logic if, and only if, V is finite, V is uncountable and 0 is isolated,
or every neighborhood of 0 in V is uncountable. These cases also determine different
sets of validities: the finite-valued Go¨del logics Gn, the logic G0, and the “standard”
infinite-valued Go¨del logic GR (based on the truth value set [0,1]).
1.2 History of Go¨del logics
Go¨del logics are one of the oldest families of many-valued logics. Propositional finite-
valued Go¨del logics were introduced by Go¨del in [Go¨d33] to show that intuitionistic
logic does not have a characteristic finite matrix. They provide the first examples of in-
termediate logics (intermediate, that is, in strength between classical and intuitionistic
logics). Dummett [Dum59] was the first to study infinite valued propositional Go¨del
logics, axiomatizing the set of tautologies over infinite truth-value sets by intuitionis-
tic logic extended by the linearity axiom (A → B)∨ (B → A). Hence, infinite-valued
propositional Go¨del logic is also sometimes called Go¨del-Dummett logic or Dummett’s
LC. In terms of Kripke semantics, the characteristic linearity axiom picks out those ac-
cessibility relations which are linear orders.
Standard first-order Go¨del logic GR—the one based on the full interval [0,1]—
has been discovered and studied by several people independently. Alfred Horn was
probably the first: He discussed this logic under the name logic with truth values in
a linearly ordered Heyting algebra [Hor69], and gave an axiomatization and the first
completeness proof. Takeuti and Titani [TT84] called GR intuitionistic fuzzy logic,
and also gave an axiomatization for which they proved the completeness. This system
incorporates the density rule
Γ ⊢ A∨ (C → p)∨ (p→ B)
Γ ⊢ A∨ (C → B)
(where p is any propositional variable not occurring in the lower sequent.) The rule is
redundant for an axiomatization of GR, as was shown by Takano [Tak87], who gave
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a streamlined completeness proof of Takeuti-Titani’s system without the rule. (A syn-
tactical proof of the elimination of the density rule was later given in [BZ00]. Other
proof-theoretic investigations of Go¨del logics can be found in [BC02] and [BFC03].)
The density rule is nevertheless interesting: It forces the truth value set to be dense
in itself (in the sense that, if the truth value set isn’t dense in itself, the rule does not
preserve validity). This contrasts with the expressive power of formulas: no formula is
valid only for truth value sets which are dense in themselves.
First-order Go¨del logics other than GR were first considered in [BLZ96b], where
it was shown that G↓, based on the truth value set V↓ = {1/k : k ∈ N}∪ {0} is not
r.e. Ha´jek [Ha´j05] has recently improved this result, and showed that not only is the
set of validities not r.e., it is not even arithmetical. Ha´jek also showed that the Go¨del
logic G↑ based on V↑ = {1− 1/k : k ∈ N}∪{1} is Π2-complete. Results preliminary
to the results of the present paper were reported in [BPZ03, Pre02, Pre03].
1.3 Overview of the results
We begin with a preliminary discussion of the syntax and semantics of Go¨del logics,
including a discussion of some of the more interesting special cases of first-order Go¨del
logics and their relationships (Section 2). In Section 3, we present some relevant results
regarding the topology of truth-value sets.
The main results of the paper are contained in Sections 4–??. We provide a com-
plete classification of the axiomatizability of first order Go¨del logics. The main results
are, that a logic based on a truth value set V is axiomatizable if and only if
1. V is finite (Section ??), or
2. V is uncountable and 0 is contained in the perfect kernel (Section 5.1), or
3. V is uncountable and 0 is isolated (Section 5.2).
In all other cases, i.e., logics with countable truth value set (Section 4) and those where
there is a countable neighborhood of 0 and 0 is not isolated (Section 5.3), the respective
logics are not r.e.
In Section 6, we investigate the complexity of fragments of first-order Go¨del logic,
specifically, the prenex fragments (Section 6.1), the ⊥-free fragments (Section 6.2),
and the existential (∀-free) fragments (Section 6.3). We show that the prenex frag-
ment of a Go¨del logic is axiomatizable if and only if the truth value set is finite or
uncountable. This means that there are truth-value sets where the prenex fragment of
the corresponding logic is r.e. even though the full logic is not. Moreover, there all
axiomatizable prenex fragments coincide. This is also the case for ⊥-free and existen-
tial fragments, but in these cases only those truth value sets determine r.e. ⊥-free and
existential fragments for which also the full logic is r.e., viz., truth value sets which
are finite, uncountable with 0 isolated, and those where every neighborhood of 0 is
uncountable.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Syntax and Semantics
In the following we fix a standard first-order language L with finitely or countably
many predicate symbols P and finitely or countably many function symbols f for every
finite arity k. In addition to the two quantifiers ∀ and ∃ we use the connectives ∨, ∧, →
and the constant ⊥ (for ‘false’); other connectives are introduced as abbreviations, in
particular we let ¬A≡ (A →⊥).
Go¨del logics are usually defined using the single truth value set [0,1]. For propo-
sitional logic the choice of any infinite subset of [0,1] leads to the same propositional
logic (set of tautologies). In the first order case, where quantifiers will be interpreted
as infima and suprema, a closed subset of [0,1] is necessary.
Definition 1 (Go¨del set). A Go¨del set is a closed set V ⊆ [0,1] which contains 0 and 1.
The semantics of Go¨del logics, with respect to a fixed Go¨del set as truth value
set and a fixed language L of predicate logic, is defined using the extended language
L U , where U is the universe of the interpretation I. L U is L extended with constant
symbols for each element of U .
Definition 2 (Semantics of Go¨del logic). Fix a Go¨del set V . An interpretation I into
V consists of
1. a nonempty set U =UI, the ‘universe’ of I,
2. for each k-ary predicate symbol P, a function PI : Uk →V ,
3. for each k-ary function symbol f , a function fI : Uk →U .
4. for each variable v, a value vI ∈U .
Given an interpretation I, we can naturally define a value tI for any term t
and a truth value I(A) for any formula A of L U . For a terms t = f (u1, . . . ,uk)
we define I(t) = fI(uI1 , . . . ,uIk ). For atomic formulas A ≡ P(t1, . . . , tn), we define
I(A) = PI(tI1 , . . . , tIn ). For composite formulas A we define I(A) by:
I(⊥) = 0 (1)
I(A∧B) = min(I(A),I(B)) (2)
I(A∨B) = max(I(A),I(B)) (3)
I(A→ B) =
{
1 I(A)≤ I(B)
I(B) otherwise
(4)
I(∀xA(x)) = inf{I(A(u)) : u ∈U} (5)
I(∃xA(x)) = sup{I(A(u)) : u ∈U} (6)
(Here we use the fact that every Go¨del sets V is a closed subset of [0,1] in order to be
able to interpret ∀ and ∃ as inf and sup in V .)
If I(A) = 1, we say that I satisfies A, and write I |= A.
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Definition 3 (Go¨del logics based on V ). For a Go¨del set V we define the first or-
der Go¨del logic GV as the set of all formulas of L such that I |= A for all V -
interpretations I.
It should be noted that for Go¨del logics with 0 isolated, the notion of satisfiability
for sets of formulas is not particularly interesting, since a set of formulas Γ is satisfiable
(in the sense that there is an I so that I |= A for all A ∈ Γ) iff it is satisfiable classically.
For this reason, we take entailment to be the fundamental model-theoretic notion.
Definition 4. If Γ is a set of formulas (possibly infinite), we say that Γ entails A in GV ,
Γ |=V A iff for all I into V ,
inf{I(B) : B ∈ Γ} ≤ I(A);
and Γ 1-entails A in GV , ΓV A, iff, for all I into V , whenever I(B) = 1 for all B ∈ Γ,
then I(A) = 1.
Notation 5. We will write Γ |= A instead of Γ |=V A in case it is obvious which truth
value set V is meant. We will sometimes write Γ |= ∆ ∈ GV , by which we mean that
Γ |=V ∆. The notation GV |= A stands for /0 |=V A, or A ∈GV .
Whether or not a formula A evaluates to 1 under an interpretation I depends only
on the relative ordering of the truth values of the atomic formulas (in L I), and not
directly on the set V or on the values of the atomic formulas. If V ⊆W are both Go¨del
sets, and I is an interpretation into V , then I can be seen also as a interpretation into
W , and the values I(A), computed recursively using (1)–(6), do not depend on whether
we view I as a V -interpretation or a W -interpretation. Consequently, if V ⊆W , there
are more interpretations into W than into V . Hence, if Γ |=W A then also Γ |=V A and
GW ⊆GV .
This can be generalized to embeddings between Go¨del sets other than inclusion.
First, we make precise which formulas are involved in the computation of the truth-
value of a formula A in an interpretation I:
Definition 6. The only subformula of an atomic formula P in L U is P itself. The
subformulas of A⋆B for ⋆∈ {→,∧,∨} are the subformulas of A and of B, together with
A ⋆B itself. The subformulas of ∀xA(x) and ∃xA(x) with respect to a universe U are
all subformulas of all A(u) for u ∈U , together with ∀xA(x) (or, ∃xA(x), respectively)
itself.
The set of truth-values of subformulas of A under a given interpretation I is denoted
by
Val(I,A) = {I(B) : B subformula of A w.r.t. UI}∪{0,1}
If Γ is a set of formulas, then Val(I,Γ) =
⋃
{Val(I,A) : A ∈ Γ}.
Lemma 7. Let I be a V-interpretation, and let h : Val(I,Γ)→W be a mapping satis-
fying the following properties:
1. h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1;
2. h is strictly monotonic, i.e., if a < b, then h(a)< h(b);
6
3. for every X ⊆ Val(I,Γ), h(infX) = infh(X) and h(supX) = suph(X) (provided
infX, supX ∈ Val(I,Γ)).
Then the W-interpretation Ih with universe UI, fIh = fI, and for atomic B ∈L I,
Ih(B) =
{
h(I(B)) if I(B) ∈ domh
1 otherwise
satisfies Ih(A) = h(I(A)) for all A ∈ Γ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A. If A ≡ ⊥, the claim follows from (1). If
A is atomic, it follows from the definition of Ih. For the propositional connectives the
claim follows from the strict monotonicity of h (2). For the quantifiers, it follows from
property (3).
Remark. Note that the construction of Ih and the proof of Lemma 7 also goes through
without the condition h(0) = 0, provided that the formulas in Γ do not contain ⊥,
and goes through without the requirement that existing inf’s be preserved (h(infX) =
infh(X) if infX ∈ Val(I,Γ)) provided they do not contain ∀.
Definition 8. A G-embedding h : V →W is a strictly monotonic, continuous mapping
between Go¨del sets which preserves 0 and 1.
Lemma 9. Suppose h : V →W is a G-embedding. (a) If I is a V-interpretation, and
Ih is the interpretation induced by I and h, then Ih(A) = h(I(A)). (b) If Γ |=W A then
Γ |=V A (and hence GW ⊆GV ). (c) If h is bijective, then Γ |=W A iff Γ |=V A (and hence,
GV = GW ).
Proof. (a) h satisfies the conditions of Lemma 7, for Γ the set of all formulas. (b) If
Γ 2V A, then for some I, I(B) = 1 for all B ∈ Γ and I(A)< 1. By Lemma 7, Ih(B) = 1
for all B ∈ Γ and Ih(A) < 1 (by strict monotonicity of h). Thus Γ 2W A. (c) If h is
bijective then h−1 is also a G-embedding.
Definition 10 (Submodel, elementary submodel). Let I1, I2 be interpretations. We
write I1 ⊆ I2 (I2 extends I1) iff UI1 ⊆UI2 , and for all k, all k-ary predicate symbols
P in L , and all k-ary function symbols f in L we have
PI1 = PI2 ↾ (UI1)k fI1 = fI2 ↾ (UI1)k
or in other words, if I1 and I2 agree on closed atomic formulas.
We write I1 ≺ I2 if I1 ⊆ I2 and I1(A) = I2(A) for all L U
I1
-formulas A.
Proposition 11 (Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem). For any interpretation I with UI
infinite, there is an interpretation I′ ≺ I with a countable universe UI′ .
Proof sketch. The proof is an easy generalization of the construction for the classical
case. We construct a sequence of countable subsets U1 ⊆U2 ⊆ ·· · of UI: U1 simply
contains tI for all closed terms of the original language. Ui+1 is constructed from Ui by
adding, for each of the (countably many) formulas of the form ∃xA(x) and ∀xA(x) in
the language L Ui , a countable sequence a j of elements of UI so that (I(A(a j))) j →
I(∃xA(x)) or → I(∀xA(x)), respectively. UI′ =
⋃
i Ui.
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Lemma 12. Let I be a interpretation into V , w ∈ [0,1], and let Iw be defined by
Iw(B) =
{
I(B) if I(B)< w
1 otherwise
for atomic formulas B in L U . Then Iw is an interpretation into V . If w /∈ Val(I,A),
then Iw(A) = I(A) if I(A)< w, and Iw(A) = 1 otherwise.
Proof. Let hw(a) = a if a < w and = 1 otherwise. By induction on the complexity of
formulas B it is easily shown that I′(B) = hw(I(B)) for all subformulas B of A w.r.t.
UI.
Proposition 13. Γ |= A iff Γ  A
Proof. Only if: obvious. If: Suppose that Γ 2 A, i.e., there is a V -interpretation I so
that inf{I(B) : B∈Γ}> I(A). By Proposition 11, we may assume that UI is countable.
Hence, there is some w with I(A) < w < inf{I(B) : B ∈ Γ} and w /∈ Val(I,Γ∪{A}).
Let Iw be as in Lemma 12. Then Iw(B) = 1 for all B ∈ Γ and Iw(A)< 1.
The coincidence of the two consequence relations is a unique feature of Go¨del
logics. Proposition 13 does not hold in Łukasiewicz logic, for instance. There, A,A→Ł
B  B but A,A→Ł B 2 B. In what follows, we will use |= when semantic consequence
is at issue; the preceding propositions shows that the results we obtain for |= hold for
 as well.
Lemma 14 (Semantic deduction theorem).
Γ,A |= B iff Γ |= A→ B.
Proof. Immediate consequence of the definition of |= and the semantics for →.
We want to conclude this part with two interesting observations:
Relation to residuated algebras If one considers the truth value set as a Heyting
algebra with a∧b = min(a,b), a∨b = max(a,b), and
a→ b =
{
1 if a≤ b
b otherwise
then → and ∧ are residuated, i.e.,
(a→ b) = sup{x : (x∧a) ≤ b}.
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The Go¨del conditional A large class of many-valued logics can be developed from
the theory of t-norms [Ha´j98]. The class of t-norm based logics includes not only (stan-
dard) Go¨del logic, but also Łukasiewicz- and product logic. In these logics, the con-
ditional is defined as the residuum of the respective t-norm, and the logics differ only
in the definition of their t-norm and the respective residuum, i.e., the conditional. The
truth function for the Go¨del conditional is of particular interest as it can be ‘deduced’
from simple properties of the evaluation and the entailment relation, a fact which was
first observed by G. Takeuti.
Lemma 15. Suppose we have a standard language containing a ‘conditional’ ։ in-
terpreted by a truth-function into [0,1]. Suppose further that
1. a conditional evaluates to 1 if the truth value of the antecedent is less or equal
to the truth value of the consequent, i.e., if I(A)≤ I(B), then I(A։ B) = 1;
2. |= is defined as above, i.e., if Γ |= B, then min{I(A) : A ∈ Γ} ≤ I(B);
3. the deduction theorem holds, i.e., Γ∪{A} |= B⇔ Γ |= A։ B.
Then ։ is the Go¨del conditional.
Proof. From (1), we have that I(A ։ B) = 1 if I(A) ≤ I(B). Since |= is reflexive,
B |= B. Since it is monotonic, B,A |= B. By the deduction theorem, B |= A ։ B. By
(2),
I(B)≤ I(A։ B).
From A։ B |= A։ B and the deduction theorem, we get A։ B,A |= B. By (2),
min{I(A։ B),I(A)} ≤ I(B).
Thus, if I(A)> I(B), I(A։ B)≤ I(B).
Note that all usual conditionals (Go¨del, Łukasiewicz, product conditionals) satisfy
condition (1). So, in some sense, the Go¨del conditional is the only many-valued condi-
tional which validates both directions of the deduction theorem for |=. For instance, for
the Łukasiewicz conditional→Ł the right-to-left direction fails: A→Ł B |= A→Ł B, but
A→Ł B,A 2 B. (With respect to , the left-to-right direction of the deduction theorem
fails for →Ł.)
2.2 Axioms and deduction systems
In this section we introduce certain axioms and deduction systems for Go¨del logics,
and we will show completeness of these deduction systems subsequently. We will use
a Hilbert style proof system:
Definition 16. A formula A is derivable from formulas Γ in a system A consisting
of the axioms and the rules iff there are formulas A0, . . . , An = A such that for each
0 ≤ i ≤ n either Ai ∈ Γ, or Ai is an instance of an axiom in A , or there are indices
j1, . . . , jl < i and a rule in A such that A j1 , . . . , A jl are the premises and Ai is the
conclusion of the rule. In this case we write Γ ⊢A A.
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We will denote by IL the following complete axiom system for intuitionistic logic
(taken from [Tro77]). Rules are written as A1, . . . ,An ⊢ A.
(I1) A,A→ B ⊢ B (I2) A→ B,B→C ⊢ A →C
(I3) A∨A→ A,A→ A∧A (I4) A→ A∨B,A∧B→ A
(I5) A∨B→ B∨A,A∧B→ B∧A (I6) A→ B ⊢C∨A→C∨B
(I7) A∧B→C ⊢ A → (B→C) (I8) A→ (B →C) ⊢ A∧B→C
(I9) ⊥→ A
(I10) B(x) → A(x) ⊢ B(x) →∀xA(x) (I11) ∀xA(x)→ A(t)
(I12) A(t)→∃xA(x) (I13) A(x)→ B(x) ⊢ ∃xA(x)→ B(x)
(where B(x) means that x is not free in B).
The following axioms will play an important roˆle (QS stands for ‘quantifier shift’, LIN
for ‘linearity’, ISO0 for ‘isolation axiom of 0’, and FIN(n) for ‘finite with n elements’):
QS ∀x(C(x)∨A(x))→ (C(x)∨∀xA(x))
LIN (A→ B)∨ (B→ A)
ISO0 ∀x¬¬A(x)→¬¬∀xA(x)
FIN(n) (⊤→ A1)∨ (A1 → A2)∨ . . .∨ (An−2 → An−1)∨ (An−1 →⊥)
Notation 17. H denotes the axiom system IL+ QS+ LIN.
Hn for n≥ 2 denotes the axiom system H+ FIN(n).
H0 denotes the axiom system H+ ISO0.
Theorem 18 (Soundness). Suppose Γ contains only closed formulas, and all axioms
of A are valid in GV . Then, if Γ ⊢A A then Γ |=V A.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of proofs. By assumption, all axioms of A are
valid in GV , hence Γ |=V Ai if Ai is an axiom. If Ai ∈ Γ, then obviously Γ |=V Ai. It
remains to show that the rules of inference preserve consequence. We show this for
modus ponens (I1) and existential generalization (I13), the other cases are analogous.
Suppose Γ |=V A and Γ |=V A → B and consider a V -interpretation I. Let v =
inf{I(C) : C ∈ Γ}. If I(A) ≤ I(B), then we have v ≤ I(B) because v ≤ I(A). If
I(A)> I(B), then v≤ I(B) because I(B) = I(A→ B).
Suppose Γ |=V A(x)→B and x does not occur free in B. Let I be a V -interpretation,
and let w = sup{I(A(u)) : u ∈UI}, and let Iu be the interpretation resulting from I
by assigning u to x. Since the formulas in Γ are all closed and B does not contain x
free, Iu(C) = I(C) for all C ∈ Γ∪{B} and u∈UI. Now suppose w > I(∃xA(x)→ B).
In this case, I(∃xA(x)) > I(B). But then, for some u ∈ UI, Iu(A(x)) > I(B) and
we’d have w > Iu(A(x)→ B), contradicting Γ |=V A(x)→ B. The case for (I10) is
analogous.
Note that the restriction to closed formulas in Γ is essential: A(x) ⊢H ∀xA(x) but
obviously A(x) 2V ∀xA(x).
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2.3 Relationships between Go¨del logics
The relationships between finite and infinite valued propositional Go¨del logics are well
understood. Any choice of an infinite set of truth-values results in the same proposi-
tional Go¨del logic, viz., Dummett’s LC. LC was defined using the set of truth-valuesV↓
(see below). Furthermore, we know that LC is the intersection of all finite-valued
propositional Go¨del logics, and that it is axiomatized by intuitionistic propositional
logic IPL plus the schema (A→ B)∨ (B→ A). IPL is contained in all Go¨del logics.
In the first-order case, the relationships are somewhat more interesting. First of all,
let us note the following fact corresponding to the end of the previous paragraph:
Proposition 19. Intuitionistic predicate logic IL is contained in all first-order Go¨del
logics.
Proof. The axioms and rules of IL are sound for the Go¨del truth functions.
As a consequence of this proposition, we will be able to use any intuitionistically
sound rule and intuitionistically true formula when working in any of the Go¨del logics.
We can consider special truth value sets which will act as prototypes for other log-
ics. This is due to the fact that the logic is defined extensionally as the set of formulas
valid in this truth value set, so the Go¨del logics on different truth value sets may coin-
cide.
VR = [0,1]
V↓ = {1/k : k ≥ 1}∪{0}
V↑ = {1− 1/k : k ≥ 1}∪{1}
Vm = {1− 1/k : 1≤ k ≤ m− 1}∪{1}
The corresponding Go¨del logics are GR, G↓, G↑, Gm. GR is the standard Go¨del logic.
The logic G↓ also turns out to be closely related to some temporal logics [BLZ96b,
BLZ96a]. G↑ is the intersection of all finite-valued first-order Go¨del logics as shown
in Theorem 23.
Proposition 20. GR =
⋂
V GV , where V ranges over all Go¨del sets.
Proof. If GV |= A for every V , then also for V = [0,1]. Conversely, if there is some
Go¨del set V and a V -interpretation I with I 2 A, then I is also a [0,1]-interpretation
and hence GR 2 A.
Proposition 21. The following strict containment relationships hold:
1. Gm )Gm+1,
2. Gm )G↑ )GR,
3. Gm )G↓ )GR.
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Proof. The only non-trivial part is proving that the containments are strict. For this
note that
(A1 → A2)∨ . . .∨ (Am → Am+1)
is valid in Gm but not in Gm+1. Furthermore, let
C↑ = ∃x(A(x)→∀yA(y)) and
C↓ = ∃x(∃yA(y)→ A(x)).
C↓ is valid in all Gm and in G↑ and G↓; C↑ is valid in all Gm and in G↑, but not in G↓;
neither is valid in GR ([BLZ96b], Corollary 2.9).
The formulas C↑ and C↓ are of some importance in the study of first-order infinite-
valued Go¨del logics. C↑ expresses the fact that every infimum in the set of truth values
is a minimum, and C↓ states that every supremum (except possibly 1) is a maximum.
The intuitionistically admissible quantifier shifting rules are given by the following
implications and equivalences:
(∀xA(x)∧B) ≡ ∀x(A(x)∧B)
(∃xA(x)∧B) ≡ ∃x(A(x)∧B)
(∀xA(x)∨B) → ∀x(A(x)∨B)
(∃xA(x)∨B) ≡ ∃x(A(x)∨B)
(B →∀xA(x)) ≡ ∀x(B → A(x))
(B →∃xA(x)) ← ∃x(B → A(x))
(∀xA(x)→ B) ← ∃x(A(x)→ B)
(∃xA(x)→ B) ≡ ∀x(A(x)→ B)
The remaining three are:
(∀xA(x)∨B) ← ∀x(A(x)∨B)
(B →∃xA(x)) → ∃x(B → A(x))
(∀xA(x)→ B) → ∃x(A(x)→ B)
(S1)
(S2)
(S3)
Of these, S1 is valid in any Go¨del logic. S2 and S3 imply and are implied by C↓ and C↑,
respectively (take ∃yA(y) and ∀yA(y), respectively, for B). S2 and S3 are, respectively,
both valid in G↑, invalid and valid in G↓, and both invalid in GR. Thus we obtain
Corollary 22. G↑ is the only Go¨del logic where every formula is equivalent to a prenex
formula with the same propositional matrix.
We now also know that G↑ 6= G↓. In fact, we have G↓ ( G↑; this follows from the
following theorem.
Theorem 23.
G↑ =
⋂
m≥2
Gm
Proof. By Proposition 21, G↑ ⊆ ⋂m≥2 Gm. We now prove the reverse inclusion. As-
sume that there is an interpretation I such that I 2 A, we want to give an interpretation
I′ such that I′ 2 A and I′ is a Gm interpretation for some m.
12
Suppose there is an interpretation I such that I 2 A, let I(A) = 1− 1/k. Let w
be somewhere between 1− 1/k and 1− 1/(k+ 1). Then the interpretation Iw given
in Lemma 12 also is a counterexample for A. Since there are only finitely many truth
values below w in V↑, Iw is a Gk+1 interpretation with Iw 2 A. This completes the proof
of the theorem.
Corollary 24. Gm )
⋂
m Gm = G↑ )G↓ )GR
As we will see later, the axioms FIN(n) axiomatize exactly the finite-valued Go¨del
logics. In these logics the quantifier shift axiom QS is not necessary. Furthermore, all
quantifier shift rules are valid in the finite valued logics. Since G↑ is the intersection of
all the finite ones, all quantifier shift rules are valid in G↑. Moreover, any infinite-valued
Go¨del logic other than G↑ is defined by some V which either contains an infimum
which is not a minimum, or a supremum (other than 1) which is not a maximum.
Hence, in V either C↑ or C↓ will be invalid, and therewith either S3 or S2. We have:
Corollary 25. G↑ is the only Go¨del logic with infinite truth value set which admits all
quantifier shift rules.
3 Topology and Order
3.1 Perfect sets
All the following notations, lemmas, theorems are carried out within the framework
of Polish spaces, which are separable, completely metrizable topological spaces. For
our discussion it is only necessary to know that R and all its closed subsets are Polish
spaces (hence, every Go¨del set is a Polish space). For a detailed exposition see [Mos80,
Kec95].
Definition 26 (limit point, perfect space, perfect set). A limit point of a topological
space is a point that is not isolated, i.e. for every open neighborhood U of x there is a
point y∈U with y 6= x. A space is perfect if all its points are limit points. A set P⊆R is
perfect if it is closed and together with the topology induced from R is a perfect space.
It is obvious that all (non-trivial) closed intervals are perfect sets, also all countable
unions of (non-trivial) intervals. But all these sets generated from closed intervals have
the property that they are ‘everywhere dense’, i.e., contained in the closure of their
inner component. There is another very famous set which is perfect but is nowhere
dense, the Cantor set:
Example (Cantor Set). The set of all numbers in the unit interval which can be ex-
pressed in triadic notation only by digits 0 and 2 is called Cantor set D.
A more intuitive way to obtain this set is to start with the unit interval, take out the
open middle third and restart this process with the lower and the upper third. Repeat-
ing this you get exactly the Cantor set because the middle third always contains the
numbers which contain the digit 1 in their triadic notation.
This set has a lot of interesting properties, the most important one is that it is a
perfect set:
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Proposition 27. The Cantor set is perfect.
It is possible to embed the Cauchy space into any perfect space, yielding the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 28. If X is a nonempty perfect Polish space, then the cardinality of X
is 2ℵ0 and therefore, all nonempty perfect subsets, too, have cardinality of the contin-
uum.
It is possible to obtain the following characterization of perfect sets (see [Win99]):
Proposition 29 (Characterization of perfect sets in R). For any perfect subset of R
there is a unique partition of the real line into countably many intervals such that the
intersections of the perfect set with these intervals are either empty, the full interval or
isomorphic to the Cantor set.
So we see that intervals and Cantor sets are prototypical for perfect sets and the
basic building blocks of more complex perfect sets.
Every Polish space can be partitioned into a perfect kernel and a countable rest.
This is the well known Cantor-Bendixon Theorem:
Theorem 30 (Cantor-Bendixon). Let X be a Polish space. Then X can be uniquely
written as X = P∪C, with P a perfect subset of X and C countable and open. The
subset P is called the perfect kernel of X (denoted with V ∞).
As a corollary we obtain that any uncountable Polish space contains a perfect set,
and therefore, has cardinality 2ℵ0 .
3.2 Relation to Go¨del logics
The following lemma was originally proved in [Pre03], where it was used to extend the
proof of recursive axiomatizability of ‘standard’ Go¨del logics (those with V = [0,1])
to Go¨del logics with a truth value set containing a perfect set in the general case. The
following more simple proof is inspired by [BGP]:
Lemma 31. Suppose that M ⊆ [0,1] is countable and P ⊆ [0,1] is perfect. Then there
is a strictly monotone continuous map h : M → P (i.e., infima and suprema already
existing in M are preserved). Furthermore, if infM ∈ M, then one can choose h such
that h(infM) = infP.
Proof. Let σ be the mapping which scales and shifts M into [0,1], i.e. the mapping
x → (x− infM)/(supM− infM) (assuming that M contains more than one point). Let
w be an injective monotone map from σ(M) into 2ω , i.e. w(m) is a fixed binary repre-
sentation of m. For dyadic rational numbers (i.e. those with different binary represen-
tations) we fix one possible.
Let i be the natural bijection from 2ω (the set of infinite {0,1}-sequences, ordered
lexicographically) onto D, the Cantor set. i is an order preserving homeomorphism.
Since P is perfect, we can find a continuous strictly monotone map c from the Cantor
set D⊆ [0,1] into P, and c can be chosen so that c(0) = infP.
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Now h = c◦ i◦w◦σ is also a strictly monotone map from M into P, and h(infM) =
infP, if infM ∈ M. Since c is continuous, existing infima and suprema are preserved.
Corollary 32. A Go¨del set V is uncountable iff it contains a non-trivial dense linear
subordering.
Proof. If: Every countable non-trivial dense linear order has order type η , 1+η , η+1,
or 1+η + 1 [Ros82, Corollary 2.9], where η is the order type of Q. The completion
of any ordering of order type η has order type λ , the order type of R [Ros82, Theo-
rem 2.30], thus the truth value set must be uncountable.
Only if: By Theorem 30, V ∞ is non-empty. Take M = Q∩ [0,1] and P = V ∞ in
Lemma 31. The image of M under h is a non-trivial dense linear subordering in V .
Theorem 33. Suppose V is a truth value set with non-empty perfect kernel P, and
let W = V ∪ [infP,1]. Then |=V = |=W , i.e. Γ |=V A iff Γ |=W A. Thus also the logics
induced by V and W are the same, i.e., GV = GW .
Proof. As V ⊆W we have |=W ⊆ |=V (cf. the Remark preceding Definition 3). Now
assume that I is a W -interpretation which shows that Γ |=W A does not hold, i.e.,
inf{I(B) : B ∈ Γ} > I(A). By Proposition 11, we may assume that UI is countable.
The set Val(I,Γ∪A) has cardinality at most ℵ0, thus there is a b ∈ [0,1] such that
b /∈ Val(I,Γ∪A) and I(A) < b < 1. By Lemma 12, Ib(A) < b < 1. Now consider
M = Val(Ib,Γ∪A): these are all the truth values from W = V ∪ [infP,1] required to
compute Ib(A) and Ib(B) for all B ∈ Γ. We have to find some way to map them to V
so that the induced interpretation is a counterexample to Γ |=V A.
Let M0 = M∩ [0, infP) and M1 = (M∩ [infP,b])∪{infP}. By Lemma 31 there is
a strictly monotone continuous (i.e. preserving all existing infima and suprema) map h
from M1 into P. Furthermore, we can choose h such that h(infM1) = infP.
We define a function g from Val(Ib,Γ∪A) to V as follows:
g(x) =


x 0≤ x ≤ infP
h(x) infP≤ x≤ b
1 x = 1
Note that there is no x ∈Val(Ib,Γ∪A) with b < x < 1. This function has the following
properties: g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1, g is strictly monotonic and preserves existing infima
and suprema. Using Lemma 7 we obtain that Ig is a V -interpretation with Ig(C) =
g(Ib(C)) for all C ∈ Γ∪A, thus also inf{Ig(B) : B ∈ Γ}> Ig(A).
4 Countable Go¨del sets
In this section we show that the first-order Go¨del logics where the set of truth values
does not contain a dense subset are not axiomatizable. We establish this result by
reducing the classical validity of a formula in all finite models to the validity of a
formula in Go¨del logic (the set of these formulas is not r.e. by Trakhtenbrot’s Theorem).
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Definition 34. A formula is called crisp if all occurrences of atomic formulas are either
negated or double-negated.
Lemma 35. If A and B are crisp and classically equivalent, then also GR |= A ↔ B.
Specifically, if A(x) and B are crisp, then
|= ∀xA(x)→ B ↔∃x(A(x)→ B) and
|= B→∃xA(x)↔∃x(B → A(x)).
Proof. Given an interpretation I, define I′(C) = 1 if I(C)> 0 and = 0 if I(C) = 0 for
atomic C. It is easily seen that if A, B are crisp, then I(A) = I′(A) and I(B) = I′(B).
But I′ is a classical interpretation, so by assumption I′(A) = I′(B).
Theorem 36. If V is countably infinite, then GV is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. By Theorem 32, V is countably infinite iff it is infinite and does not contain
a non-trivial densely ordered subset. We show that for every sentence A there is a
sentence Ag s.t. Ag is valid in GV iff A is true in every finite (classical) first-order
structure.
We define Ag as follows: Let P be a unary and L be a binary predicate symbol
not occurring in A and let Q1, . . . , Qn be all the predicate symbols in A. We use the
abbreviations x ∈ y ≡ ¬¬L(x,y) and x ≺ y ≡ (P(y)→ P(x))→ P(y). Note that for
any interpretation I, I(x ∈ y) is either 0 or 1, and as long as I(P(x)) < 1 for all x (in
particular, if I(∃zP(z))< 1), we have I(x ≺ y) = 1 iff I(P(x))< I(P(y)). Let Ag ≡{
S∧ c1 ∈ 0∧ c2 ∈ 0∧ c2 ≺ c1∧
∀i
[
∀x,y∀ j∀k∃zD∨∀x¬(x ∈ s(i))]
}
→ (A′∨∃uP(u)) (7)
where S is the conjunction of the standard axioms for 0, successor and ≤, with double
negations in front of atomic formulas,
D≡ ( j ≤ i∧ x ∈ j∧ k ≤ i∧ y ∈ k∧ x≺ y)→
→ (z ∈ s(i)∧ x≺ z∧ z≺ y)
and A′ is A where every atomic formula is replaced by its double negation, and all
quantifiers are relativized to the predicate R(i)≡ ∃x(x ∈ i).
Intuitively, L is a predicate that divides a subset of the domain into levels, and x ∈ i
means that x is an element of level i. If the antecendent is true, then the true standard
axioms S force the domain to be a model of PA, which could be either a standard model
(isomorphic to N) or a non-standard model (N followed by copies of Z). P orders the
elements of the domain which fall into one of the levels in a subordering of the truth
values.
The idea is that for any two elements in a level ≤ i there is an element in a not-
empty level j ≥ i which lies strictly between those two elements in the ordering given
by ≺. If this condition cannot be satisfied, the levels above i are empty. Clearly, this
condition can be satisfied in an interpretation I only for finitely many levels if V does
not contain a dense subset, since if more than finitely many levels are non-empty, then⋃
i{I(P(d)) : I |= d ∈ i} gives a dense subset. By relativizing the quantifiers in A to
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the indices of non-empty levels, we in effect relativize to a finite subset of the domain.
We make this more precise:
Suppose A is classically false in some finite structure I. W.l.o.g. we may as-
sume that the domain of this structure is the naturals 0, . . . , n. We extend I to a GV -
interpretation Ig with domain N as follows: Since V contains infinitely many values,
we can choose c1, c2, L and P so that ∃x(x ∈ i) is true for i = 0, . . . , n and false other-
wise, and so that Ig(∃xP(x)) < 1. The number-theoretic symbols receive their natural
interpretation. The antecedent of Ag clearly receives the value 1, and the consequent
receives Ig(∃xP(x)) < 1, so Ig 2 Ag.
Now suppose that I 2 Ag. Then I(∃xP(x)) < 1. In this case, I(x ≺ y) = 1 iff
I(P(x)) < I(P(y)), so ≺ defines a strict order on the domain of I. It is easily seen
that in order for the value of the antecedent of Ag under I to be greater than that of the
consequent, it must be = 1 (the values of all subformulas are either ≤ I(∃xP(x)) or
= 1). For this to happen, of course, what the antecedent is intended to express must
actually be true in I, i.e., that x ∈ i defines a series of levels and any level i > 0 is either
empty, or for all x, and y occuring in some smaller level there is a z with x≺ z≺ y and
z ∈ i.
To see this, consider the relevant part of the antecedent, B = ∀i
[
∀x,y∀ j∀k∃zD∨
∀x¬(x ∈ i)
]
. If I(B) = 1, then for all i, either I(∀x,y∀ j∀k∃zD) = 1 or I(∀x¬(x ∈ i)) =
1. In the first case, we have I(∃zD) = 1 for all x, y, j, and k. Now suppose that for all
z, I(D)< 1, yet I(∃zD) = 1. Then for at least some z the value of that formula would
have to be > I(∃zP(z)), which is impossible. Thus, for every x, y, j, k, there is a z such
that I(D) = 1. But this means that for all x, y s.t. x ∈ j, y ∈ k with j,k ≤ i and x ≺ y
there is a z with x≺ z≺ y and z ∈ i+ 1.
In the second case, where I(∀x¬(x ∈ i)) = 1, we have that I(¬(x ∈ i)) = 1 for all
x, hence I(x ∈ i) = 0 and level i is empty.
Note that the non empty levels can be distributed over the whole range of the non-
standard model, but since V contains no dense subset, the total number of non empty
levels is finite. Thus, A is false in the classical interpretation Ic obtained from I by
restricting I to the domain {i : ∃x(x ∈ i)} and Ic(Q) = I(¬¬Q) for atomic Q.
This shows that no infinite-valued Go¨del logic whose set of truth values does not
contain a dense subset, i.e., no countably infinite Go¨del logic is axiomatizable. We
strengthen this result in Section 6.1 to show that the prenex fragments are likewise not
axiomatizable.
5 Uncountable Go¨del sets
5.1 0 is contained in the perfect kernel
If V is uncountable, and 0 is contained in V ∞, then GV is axiomatizable. Indeed,
Theorem 33 showed that the sets of validities of all such V coincide. Thus, it is only
necessary to establish completeness of the axioms system H with respect to GR. This
result has been shown by several people over the years. We give here a generalization
of the proof of Takano [Tak87].
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Theorem 37 (Strong completeness of Go¨del logic [Tak87]). If Γ |= A in GR, then
Γ ⊢H A.
Proof. Assume that Γ 0 A, we construct an interpretation I in which I(A) = 1 for all
B ∈ Γ and I(A)< 1. Let y1, y2, . . . be a sequence of free variables which do not occur
in Γ∪∆, let T be the set of all terms in the language of Γ∪∆ together with the new
variables y1, y2, . . . , and let F = {F1,F2, . . .} be an enumeration of the formulas in this
language in which yi does not appear in F1, . . . , Fi and in which each formula appears
infinitely often.
If ∆ is a set of formulas, we write Γ ⇒ ∆ if for some A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ, and some
B1, . . . , Bm ∈ ∆, ⊢H (A1 ∧ . . .∧An)→ (B1 ∨ . . .∨Bm) (and ; if this is not the case).
We define a sequence of sets of formulas Γn, ∆n such that Γn ; ∆n by induction. First,
Γ0 = Γ and ∆0 = {A}. By the assumption of the theorem, Γ0 ; ∆0.
If Γn ⇒ ∆n ∪{Fn}, then Γn+1 = Γn ∪{Fn} and ∆n+1 = ∆n. In this case, Γn+1 ;
∆n+1, since otherwise we would have Γn ⇒ ∆n∪{Fn} and Γn∪{Fn} ⇒ ∆n. But then,
we’d have that Γn ⇒∆n, which contradicts the induction hypothesis (note that ⊢H (A→
B∨F)→ ((A∧F → B)→ (A→ B))).
If Γn ; ∆n ∪{Fn}, then Γn+1 = Γn and ∆n+1 = ∆n ∪{Fn,B(yn)} if Fn ≡ ∀xB(x),
and ∆n+1 = ∆n ∪ {Fn} otherwise. In the latter case, it is obvious that Γn+1 ; ∆n+1.
In the former, observe that by I10 and QS, if Γn ⇒ ∆n ∪ {∀xB(x),B(yn)} then also
Γn ⇒ ∆n∪{∀xB(x)} (note that yn does not occur in Γn or ∆n).
Let Γ∗ =
⋃
∞
i=0 Γi and ∆∗ =
⋃
∞
i=0 ∆i. We have:
1. Γ∗; ∆∗, for otherwise there would be a k so that Γk ⇒ ∆k.
2. Γ ⊆ Γ∗ and ∆⊆ ∆∗ (by construction).
3. Γ∗ =F \∆∗, since each Fn is either in Γn+1 or ∆n+1, and if for some n, Fn ∈ Γ∗∩
∆∗, there would be a k so that Fn ∈ Γk ∩∆k, which is impossible since Γk ; ∆k.
4. If Γ∗ ⇒ B1∨ . . .∨Bn, then Bi ∈ Γ∗ for some i. For suppose not, then for i = 1,
. . . , n, Bi /∈ Γ∗, and hence, by (3), Bi ∈ ∆∗. But then Γ∗⇒ ∆∗, contradicting (1).
5. If B(t) ∈ Γ∗ for every t ∈T , then ∀xB(x) ∈ Γ∗. Otherwise, by (3), ∀xB(x) ∈ ∆∗
and so there is some n so that ∀xB(x) = Fn and ∆n+1 contains ∀xB(x) and B(yn).
But, again by (3), then B(yn) /∈ Γ∗.
6. Γ∗ is closed under provable implication, since if Γ∗ ⇒ A, then A /∈ ∆∗ and so,
again by (3), A ∈ Γ∗. In particular, if ⊢H A, then A ∈ Γ∗.
Define relations  and ≡ on F by
BC ⇔ B→C ∈ Γ∗ and B ≡C ⇔ B C∧C  B.
Then  is reflexive and transitive, since for every B, ⊢H B → B and so B → B ∈ Γ∗,
and if B →C ∈ Γ∗ and C → D ∈ Γ∗ then B →D ∈ Γ∗, since B →C,C → D ⇒ B→ D
(recall (6) above). Hence, ≡ is an equivalence relation on F . For every B in F we
let |B| be the equivalence class under ≡ to which B belongs, and F/≡ the set of all
equivalence classes. Next we define the relation ≤ on F/≡ by
|B| ≤ |C| ⇔ BC ⇔ B→C ∈ Γ∗.
Obviously,≤ is independent of the choice of representatives A, B.
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Lemma 38. 〈F/≡,≤〉 is a countably linearly ordered structure with distinct maximal
element |⊤| and minimal element |⊥|.
Proof. Since F is countably infinite, F/≡ is countable. For every B and C, ⊢H (B→
C)∨ (C → B) by LIN, and so either B → C ∈ Γ∗ or C → B ∈ Γ∗ (by (4)), hence ≤ is
linear. For every B, ⊢H B →⊤ and ⊢H ⊥→ B, and so B →⊤ ∈ Γ∗ and ⊥→ B ∈ Γ∗,
hence |⊤| and |⊥| are the maximal and minimal elements, respectively. Pick any A in
∆∗. Since ⊤→⊥⇒ A, and A /∈ Γ∗, ⊤→⊥ /∈ Γ∗, so |⊤| 6= |⊥|.
We abbreviate |⊤| by 1 and |⊥| by 0.
Lemma 39. The following properties hold in 〈F/≡,≤〉:
1. |B|= 1⇔ B ∈ Γ∗.
2. |B∧C|= min{|B|, |C|}.
3. |B∨C|= max{|B|, |C|}.
4. |B→C|= 1 if |B| ≤ |C|, |B→C|= |C| otherwise.
5. |¬B|= 1 if |B|= 0; |¬B|= 0 otherwise.
6. |∃xB(x)|= sup{|B(t)| : t ∈ T }.
7. |∀xB(x)|= inf{|B(t)| : t ∈T }.
Proof. (1) If |B| = 1, then ⊤→ B ∈ Γ∗, and hence B ∈ Γ∗. And if B ∈ Γ∗, then ⊤→
B ∈ Γ∗ since B⇒⊤→ B. So |⊤| ≤ |B|. It follows that |⊤|= |B| as also |B| ≤ |⊤|.
(2) From⇒B∧C→B,⇒B∧C→C and D→B,D→C⇒D→ B∧C for every D,
it follows that |B∧C| = inf{|B|, |C|}, from which (2) follows since ≤ is linear. (3) is
proved analogously.
(4) If |B| ≤ |C|, then B → C ∈ Γ∗, and since ⊤ ∈ Γ∗ as well, |B → C| = 1. Now
suppose that |B| |C|. From B∧ (B→C)⇒C it follows that min{|B|, |B→C|} ≤ |C|.
Because |B| |C|, min{|B|, |B →C|} 6= |B|, hence |B →C| ≤ |C|. On the other hand,
⊢C → (B→C), so |C| ≤ |B→C|.
(5) If |B|= 0, ¬B = B→⊥∈ Γ∗, and hence |¬B|= 1 by (1). Otherwise, |B| |⊥|,
and so by (4), |¬B|= |B →⊥|= 0.
(6) Since ⊢H B(t)→∃xB(x), |B(t)| ≤ |∃xB(x)| for every t ∈T . On the other hand,
for every D without x free,
|B(t)| ≤ |D| for every t ∈ T
⇔ B(t)→D ∈ Γ∗ for every t ∈ T
⇒ ∀x(B(x)→ D) ∈ Γ∗ by property (5) of Γ∗
⇒ ∃xB(x)→D ∈ Γ∗ since ∀x(B(x)→D)⇒∃xB(x)→ D
⇔ |∃xB(x)| ≤ |D|.
(7) is proved analogously.
〈F/≡,≤〉 is countable, let 0 = a0,1 = a1,a2, . . . be an enumeration. Define h(0) =
0, h(1) = 1, and define h(an) inductively for n > 1: Let a−n = max{ai : i < n and ai <
an} and a+n = min{ai : i < n and ai > an}, and define h(an) = (h(a−n )+h(a+n ))/2 (thus,
a−2 = 0 and a
+
2 = 1 as 0 = a0 < a2 < a1 = 1, hence h(a2) =
1
2 ). Then h : 〈F/≡,≤〉→
Q∩ [0,1] is a strictly monotone map which preserves infs and sups. By Lemma 31 there
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exists a G-embedding h′ from Q∩ [0,1] into 〈[0,1],≤〉 which is also strictly monotone
and preserves infs and sups. Put I(B) = h′(h(|B|)) for every atomic B ∈ F and we
obtain a VR-interpretation.
Note that for every B, I(B) = 1 iff |B|= 1 iff B ∈ Γ∗. Hence, we have I(B) = 1 for
all B ∈ Γ while if A /∈ Γ∗, then I(A) < 1, so Γ 2 A. Thus we have proven that on the
assumption that if Γ 0 A, then Γ 2 A
As already mentioned we obtain from this completeness proof together with the
soundness theorem (Theorem 18) and Theorem 33 the characterization of recursive
axiomatizability:
Theorem 40. Let V be a Go¨del set with 0 contained in the perfect kernel of V . Suppose
that Γ is a set of closed formulas. Then Γ |=V A iff Γ ⊢H A.
Corollary 41 (Deduction theorem for Go¨del logics). Suppose that Γ is a set of for-
mulas, and A is a closed formula. Then
Γ,A ⊢H B iff Γ ⊢H A→ B.
Proof. Use the soundness theorem (Theorem 18), completeness theorem (Theorem 40)
and the semantic deduction theorem 14. Another proof would be by induction on the
length of the proof. See [Ha´j98], Theorem 2.2.18.
5.2 0 is isolated
In the case where 0 is isolated, and thus also not contained in the perfect kernel, we
will transform a counter example in GR for Γ,Π |= A, where Π is a set of sentences
stating that every infimum is a minimum, into a counter example in GV for Γ |= A.
Lemma 42. Let x, y¯ be the free variables in A.
⊢H0 ∀y¯(¬∀xA(x, y¯)→∃x¬A(x, y¯))
Proof. It is easy to see that in all Go¨del logics the following weak form of the
law of excluded middle is valid: ¬¬A(a) ∨ ¬A(a). By quantification we obtain
∀x¬¬A(x)∨∃x¬A(x) and by valid quantifier shifting rules ¬¬∀xA(x)∨∃¬A(x). From
the intuitionistically valid ¬A∨B → (A → B) we can prove ¬∀xA(x)→ ∃x¬A(x). A
final quantification of the free variables concludes the proof.
Theorem 43. Let V be an uncountable Go¨del set where 0 is isolated. Suppose Γ is a
set of closed formulas. Then Γ |=V A iff Γ ⊢H0 A.
Proof. If: Follows from soundness (Theorem 18) and the observation that ISO0 is valid
for any V where 0 is isolated.
Only if: We already know from Theorem 33 that the entailment relation of V and
V ∪ [infP,1] coincide, where P is the perfect kernel of V . So we may assume wthout
loss of generality that V already is of this form, i.e. that λ = infP and V ∩ [λ ,1] = [λ ,1].
Let V ′ = [0,1]. Define
Π = {∀y¯(¬∀xA(x, y¯)→∃x¬A(x, y¯)) : A(x, y¯) formula}
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where A(x, y¯) ranges over all formulas with free variables x and y¯. We consider the
entailment relation in V ′. Either Π,Γ |=V ′ A or Π,Γ 2V ′ A. In the former case we know
from the strong completeness of H for GR that there are finite subsets Π′ and Γ′ of Π
and Γ, respectively, such that Π′,Γ′ ⊢H A. Since all the sentences in Π are provable in
H0 (see Lemma 42) we obtain that Γ′ ⊢H0 A. In the latter case there is an interpretation
I′ such that
inf{I′(G) : G ∈Π∪Γ}> I′(A).
It is obvious from the structure of the formulas in Π that their truth value will always
be either 0 or 1. Combined with the above we know that for all G ∈Π, I′(G) = 1. Next
we define a function f (x) which maps values from Val(I′,Γ∪Π∪{A}) into V :
f (x) =
{
0 x = 0
λ + x/(1−λ ) x > 0
We see that f satisfies conditions (1) and (2) of Lemma 7, but we cannot use Lemma 7
directly, as not all existing infima and suprema are necessarily preserved.
Consider as in Lemma 7 the interpretation I f (B) = f (I′(B)) for atomic subfor-
mulas of Γ∪Π∪{A}. We want to show that the identity I f (B) = f (I′(B)) extends
to all subformulas of Γ∪Π∪{A}. For propositional connectives and the existentially
quantified formulas this is obvious. The important case is ∀xA(x). First assume that
I′(∀xA(x)) > 0. Then it is obvious that I f (∀xA(x)) = f (I′(∀xA(x))). In the case
where I′(∀xA(x)) = 0 we observe that A(x) contains a free variable and therefore
¬∀xA(x)→∃x¬A(x) ∈Π, thus I′(¬∀xA(x)→∃x¬A(x)) = 1. This implies that there
is a witness c such that I′(A(c)) = 0. Using the induction hypothesis we know that
I f (A(c)) = 0, too. We obtain that I f (∀xA(x)) = 0, concluding the proof.
Thus we have shown that I f is a counterexample to Γ |=V A which completes the
proof of the theorem.
5.3 0 not isolated but not in the perfect kernel
In the preceding sections, we gave axiomatizations for the logics based on those un-
countably infinite Go¨del sets V where 0 is either isolated or in the perfect kernel of V .
It remains to determine whether logics based on uncountable Go¨del sets where 0 is
neither isolated nor in the perfect kernel are axiomatizable. The answer in this case is
negative. If 0 is not isolated in V , 0 has a countably infinite neighborhood. Furthermore,
any sequence (an)n∈N→ 0 is so that, for sufficiently large n, V ∩ [0,an] is countable and
hence, by (the proof of) Theorem 32, contains no densely ordered subset. This fact is
the basis for the following non-axiomatizability proof, which is a variation on the proof
of Theorem 36.
Theorem 44. If V is uncountable, 0 is not isolated in V , but not in the perfect kernel
of V , then GV is not axiomatizable.
Proof. We show that for every sentence A there is a sentence Ah s.t. Ah is valid in GV
iff A is true in every finite (classical) first-order structure.
The definition of Ah mirrors the definition of Ag in the proof of Theorem 36, except
that the construction there is carried out infinitely many times for V ∩ [0,an], where
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(an)n∈N is a strictly descending sequence, an > 0 for all n, which converges to 0. Let P
be a binary and L be a ternary predicate symbol not occurring in A and let R1, . . . , Rn be
all the predicate symbols in A. We use the abbreviations x ∈ℓ y≡ ¬¬L(x,y, ℓ) and x≺ℓ
y ≡ (P(y, ℓ)→ P(x, ℓ))→ P(y, ℓ). As before, for a fixed ℓ, provided I(∃xP(x, ℓ)) < 1,
I(x ≺ℓ y) = 1 iff I(P(x, ℓ)) < I(P(y, ℓ)), and I(x ∈ℓ y) is always either 0 or 1. We
also need a binary predicate symbol Q(ℓ) to give us the descending sequence (an)n∈N:
Note that I(¬∀ℓQ(ℓ)) = 1 iff inf{I(Q(d)) : d ∈ |I|}= 0 and I(∃ℓ¬Q(ℓ)) = 1 iff 0 /∈
{I(Q(d)) : d ∈ |I|}.
Let Ah ≡

S∧∀ℓ((Q(s(ℓ))→ Q(ℓ))→ Q(s(ℓ))∧
¬∀ℓQ(ℓ)∧∃ℓ¬Q(ℓ)∧
∀ℓ∀x((Q(ℓ)→ P(x, ℓ))→ Q(ℓ))∧
∀ℓ∃x∃y(x ∈ℓ 0∧ y ∈ℓ 0∧ x≺ℓ y)∧
∀ℓ∀i
[
∀x,y∀ j∀k∃zE ∨∀x¬(x ∈ℓ s(i))
]


→ (A′∨∃ℓ∃uP(u, ℓ)∨∃ℓQ(ℓ)) (8)
where S is the conjunction of the standard axioms for 0, successor and ≤, with double
negations in front of atomic formulas,
E ≡ ( j ≤ i∧ x ∈ℓ j∧ k ≤ i∧ y ∈ℓ k∧ x≺ℓ y)→
→ (z ∈ℓ s(i)∧ x ≺ℓ z∧ z≺ℓ y)
and A′ is A where every atomic formula is replaced by its double negation, and all
quantifiers are relativized to the predicate R(ℓ)≡ ∀i∃x(x ∈ℓ i).
The idea here is that an interpretation I will define a sequence (an)n∈N → 0 by
an = I(Q(n¯)) where an > an+1, and 0 < an < 1 for all n. Let Liℓ = {x : I(x ∈ℓ i)} be
the i-th ℓ-level. P(x, ℓ) orders the set
⋃
i Liℓ = {x : I(∃ix ∈ℓ i) = 1} in a subordering of
V ∩ [0,an]: x≺ℓ y iff I(x≺ℓ y) = 1. Again we force that whenever x,y∈ Liℓ with x≺ℓ y,
there is a z ∈ Li+1ℓ with x ≺ℓ z ≺ℓ y, or, if no possible such z exists, L
i+1
ℓ = /0. Let r(ℓ)
be the least i so that Liℓ is empty, or ∞ otherwise. If r(ℓ) = ∞ then there is a densely
ordered subset of V ∩ [0,aℓ]. So if 0 is not in the perfect kernel, for some sufficiently
large L, r(ℓ) < ∞ for all ℓ > L. I(R(ℓ)) = 1 iff r(ℓ) = ∞ hence {ℓ : I(R(ℓ)) = 1} is
finite whenever the interpretations of P, L, and Q are as intended.
Now if A is classically false in some finite structure I, we can again choose a GV -
interpretation Ih in which the interpretations of P, Q, L are as intended, the number
theoretic predicates and functions receive their standard interpretation, there are as
many ℓ with Ih(R(ℓ)) = 1 as there are elements in the domain of I, and the predicates
of A behave on {ℓ : I(R(ℓ)) = 1} just as they do on I. Ih 2 Ah.
On the other hand, if I 2 Ah, then the value of the consequent is < 1. Then as
required, for all x, ℓ, I(P(x, ℓ)) < 1 and I(Q(ℓ))< 1. Since the antecedent, as before,
must be = 1, this means that x ≺ℓ y expresses a strict ordering of the elements of Liℓ
and I(((Q(s(ℓ)→Q(ℓ))→Q(s(ℓ))) = 1 for all ℓ guarantees that I(Q(s(ℓ))) = an+1 <
an = I(Q(ℓ)). The other conditions are likewise seen to hold as intended, so that we can
extract a finite countermodel for A based on the interpretation of the predicate symbols
of A on {ℓ : I(R(ℓ)) = 1}, which must be finite.
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6 Fragments
6.1 Prenex fragments
One interesting restriction of the axiomatizability problem is the question whether the
prenex fragment of GV , i.e., the set of prenex formulas valid in GV , is axiomatizable.
This is non-trivial, since in general in Go¨del logics, arbitrary formulas are not equiva-
lent to prenex formulas. Thus, so far the proofs of non-axiomatizability of the logics
treated in Sections 4 and 5.3 do not establish the non-axiomatizability of their prenex
fragments, nor do they exclude the possibility that the corresponding prenex fragments
are r.e. We investigate this question in this section, and show that the prenex fragments
of all finite and uncountable Go¨del logics are r.e., and that the prenex fragments of
all countably infinite Go¨del logics are not r.e. The axiomatizability result is obtained
from a version of Herbrand’s Theorem for finite and uncountably-valued Go¨del logics,
which is of independent interest. The non-axiomatizability of countably infinite Go¨del
logics is obtained as a corrolary of Theorem 36.
Let V be a Go¨del set which is either finite or uncountable. Let GV be a Go¨del
logic with such a truth value set. We show how to effectively associate with each
prenex formula A a quantifier-free formula A∗ which is valid in GV if and only if A
is a tautology. The axiomatizability of the prenex fragment of GV then follows from
the axiomatizability of LC (in the infinite-valued case) and propositional Gm (in the
finite-valued case).
Definition 45 (Herbrand form). Given a prenex formula A ≡ Q1x1 . . .Qnxn B(x¯) (B
quantifier free), the Herbrand form AH of A is ∃xi1 . . .∃xim B(t1, . . . , tn), where {xi j :
1 ≤ j ≤ m} is the set of existentially quantified variables in A, and ti is xi j if i = i j, or
is fi(xi1 , . . . ,xik) if xi is universally quantified and k = max{ j : i j < i}. We will write
B(t1, . . . , tn) as BF(xi1 , . . . ,xim) if we want to emphasize the free variables.
Lemma 46. If A is prenex and GV |= A, then GV |= AH .
Proof. Follows from the usual laws of quantification, which are valid in all Go¨del
logics.
Our next main result will be Herbrand’s theorem for GV for V uncountable or finite.
The Herbrand universe HU(BF) of BF is the set of all variable-free terms which can
be constructed from the set of function symbols occurring in BF . To prevent HU(BF)
from being finite or empty we add a constant and a function symbol of positive arity
if no such symbols appear in BF . The Herbrand base HB(BF) is the set of atoms
constructed from the predicate symbols in BF and the terms of the Herbrand universe.
In the next theorem we will consider the Herbrand universe of a formula ∃xBF(x). We
fix a non-repetitive enumeration C1, C2, . . . of HB(BF), and let Xℓ = {⊥,C1, . . . ,Cℓ,⊤}
(we may take ⊤ to be a formula which is always = 1). BF(t) is an ℓ-instance of BF(x)
if the atomic subformulas of BF(t) are in Xℓ.
Definition 47. An ℓ-constraint is a non-strict linear ordering of Xℓ s.t. ⊥ is minimal
and ⊤ is maximal. An interpretation I fulfils the constraint  provided for all C,C′ ∈
Xℓ, C C′ iff I(C)≤ I(C′). We say that the constraint ′ on Xℓ+1 extends  if for all
C,C′ ∈ Xℓ, C C′ iff C ′ C′.
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Lemma 9 showed that if h : V →W is a G-embedding and I is a V -interpretation,
then h(I(A)) = Ih(A) for any formula A. If no quantifiers are involved in A, this also
holds without the requirement of continuity. For the following proof we need a similar
notion. Let V be a Go¨del sets, X a set of atomic formulas, and suppose there is an
order-preserving, strictly monotone h : {I(C) : C ∈ X} → V which is so that h(1) = 1
and h(0) = 0. Call any such h a truth value injection on X . Now suppose B is a
quantifier-free formula, and X its set of atomic subformulas. Two interpretations I, J
are compatible on X if I(C)≤ I(C′) iff J(C)≤ J(C′) for all C ∈ X .
Proposition 48. Let BF be a quantifier free formula, and X its set of atomic subfor-
mulas together with ⊤, ⊥. If I, J are compatible on X, then there is a truth value
injection h on X with h(I(CF)) = J(CF).
Proof. Let h(I(C)) = J(C) for B ∈ X . Since I, J are compatible on X , I(C) ≤ I(C′)
iff J(C) ≤ J(C′), and hence I(C) ≤ I(C′) iff h(I(C)) ≤ h(J(C′)) and h is strictly
monotonic. The conditions h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1 are satisfied by definition, since ⊤,
⊥ ∈ X . We get h(I(BF)) = J(BF) by induction on the complexity of A.
Proposition 49. (a) If ′ extends , then every I which fulfills ′ also fulfills .
(b) If I, J fulfill the ℓ-constraint , then there is a truth value injection h on Xℓ with
h(I(BF(t))) = J(BF(t)) for all ℓ-instances BF(t) of BF(x); in particular, I(BF(t)) = 1
iff J(BF(t)) = 1.
Proof. (a) Obvious. (b) Follows from Proposition 48 together with the observation that
I and J both fulfill  iff they are compatible on Xℓ.
Lemma 50. Let BF be a quantifier-free formula, and let V be a finite or uncountably
infinite Go¨del set. If GV |= ∃xBF(x) then there are tuples t1, . . . tn of terms in U(BF),
such that GV |=
∨n
i=1 BF(ti).
Proof. Suppose first that V is uncountable. By Theorem 32, V contains a dense linear
subordering. We construct a “semantic tree” T; i.e., a systematic representation of
all possible order types of interpretations of the atoms Ci in the Herbrand base. T is
a rooted tree whose nodes appear at levels. Each node at level ℓ is labelled with an
ℓ-constraint.
T is constructed in levels as follows: At level 0, the root of T is labelled with the
constraint ⊥ < ⊤. Let ν be a node added at level ℓ with label , and let Tℓ be the set
of terms occurring in Xℓ. Let (*) be: For every interpretation I which fulfils , there is
some ℓ-instance BF(t) so that I(BF(t)) = 1. If (*) obtains, ν is a leaf node of T, and
no successor nodes are added at level ℓ+ 1.
Note that by Proposition 49(b), any two interpretations which fulfill  make the
same ℓ-instances of BF(t) true; hence ν is a leaf node if and only if there is an ℓ-
instance A(t) s.t. I(A(t)) = 1 for all interpretations I that fulfil .
If (*) does not obtain, for each (ℓ+1)-constraint′ extendingwe add a successor
node ν ′ labelled with ′ to ν at level ℓ+ 1.
We now have two cases:
(1) T is finite. Let ν1, . . . ,νm be the leaf nodes of T of levels ℓ1, . . . , ℓm, each
labelled with a constraint1, . . . , m. By (*), for each j there is an ℓ j-instance BF(t j)
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with I(BF(t)) = 1 for all I which fulfill  j. It is easy to see that every interpretation
fulfills at least one of the  j. Hence, for all I, I(BF(t1)∨ . . .∨BF(tm)) = 1, and so
GV |=
∨m
i=1 BF(t i).
(2) T is infinite. By Ko¨nig’s lemma, T has an infinite branch with nodes ν0, ν1,
ν2, . . . where νℓ is labelled by ℓ and is of level ℓ. Each ℓ+1 extends ℓ, hence we
can form  =
⋃
ℓℓ. Let V ′ ⊆ V be a non-trivial densely ordered subset of V , let
V ′ ∋ c < 1, and let V ′′ = V ′ ∩ [0,c). V ′′ is clearly also densely ordered. Now let Vc
be V ′′∪{0,1}, and let h : B(A(x))∪{⊥,⊤}→ Vc be an injection which is so that, for
all Ai,A j ∈ B(A(x)), h(Ai) ≤ h(A j) iff Ai  A j, h(⊥) = 0 and h(⊤) = 1. We define
an interpretation I by: fI(t1, . . . , tn) = f (t1, . . . , tn) for all n-ary function symbols f
and PI(t1, . . . , tn) = h(P(t1, . . . , tn)) for all n-ary predicate symbols P (clearly then,
I(Ai) = h(Ai)). By definition, I ℓ-fulfills ℓ for all ℓ. By (*), I(A(t)) < 1 for all
ℓ-instances A(t) of A(x), and by the definition of Vc, I(A(t)) < c. Since every A(t)
with t ∈U(A(x)) is an ℓ-instance of A(x) for some ℓ, we have I(∃xA(x))≤ c < 1.This
contradicts the assumption that GV |= ∃xA(x).
If V is finite, the proof is the similar, except simpler. Suppose |V | = n. Call a
constraint  n-admissible if there is some V -interpretation I which fulfills it. Such
 have no more than n equivalence classes under the equivalence relation C ∼ C′ iff
CC′ and C′C. In the construction of the semantic tree above, replace each mention
of ℓ-constraints by n-admissible ℓ-constraints. The argument in the case where the
resulting tree is finite is the same. If T is infinite, then the resulting order =
⋃
ℓℓ is
n-admissible, since all ℓ are. Let c = max{b : b ∈ V,b < 1} and Vc = V . The rest of
the argument goes through without change.
Lemma 51. Let ∃xBF(x) be the Herbrand form of the prenex formula A ≡ QiB(yi),
and let t1, . . . , tm be tuples of terms in HU(BF). If GV |=∨mi=1 BF(ti), then GV |= A.
Proof. For any Go¨del set V , the following rules are valid in GV :
(1) A∨B ⊢ B∨A.
(2) (A∨B)∨C ⊢ A∨ (B∨C) .
(3) A∨ (B∨B) ⊢ A∨B .
(4) A(y) ⊢ ∀xA(x).
(5) A(t) ⊢ ∃xA(x).
(6) ∀x(A(x)∨B) ⊢ ∀xA(x)∨B.
(7) ∃x(A(x)∨B) ⊢ ∃xA(x)∨B.
(x is not free in B.) The result follows from [BCF01], Lemma 6, and are also easily
verified directly.
Theorem 52. Let A be prenex, ∃xBF(x) its Herbrand form, and let V be a finite or
uncountably infinite Go¨del set. Then GV |= A iff there are tuples t1, . . . tm of terms in
HU(BF), such that GV |=
∨m
i=1 BF(t i).
Proof. If: This is Lemma 51. Only if: By Lemma 46 and Lemma 50.
Remark. An alternative proof of Herbrand’s theorem can be obtained using the analytic
calculus HIF (“Hypersequent calculus for Intuitionistic Fuzzy logic”) [BZ00].
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Theorem 53. The prenex fragment of a Go¨del logic based on a truth value set V
which is either finite or uncountable infinite is axiomatizable. An axiomatization is
given by the standard axioms and rules for LC extended by the rules (4)–(7) of the
proof of Lemma 51. For the m-valued case add the characteristic axiom for Gm, Gm ≡∨m
i=1
∨m+1
j=i+1((Ai → A j)∧ (A j → Ai)).
Proof. Completeness: Let QyiB(y) be a prenex formula valid in GV . By Theorem 52,
a Herbrand disjunction ∨ni=1 BF(t i) is a tautology in GV . Hence, it is provable in LC
or LC+Gm [Got01, Chapter 10.1]. QyB(y) is provable by Lemma 51.
Soundness: The rules in the proof of Lemma 51 are valid in GV . In particular, note
that ∀x(A(x)∨B)→ (∀xA(x)∨B) with x not free in B is valid in all Go¨del logics, and
∃x(A(x)∨B)→∃xA(x)∨B is already intuitionistically valid.
In Theorem 36, we showed that for every first-order formula A, there is a formula
Ag which is valid in GV for V countably infinite iff A is valid in every finite classical
interpretation. We now strengthen this result to show that the prenex fragment of GV
(for V countably infinite) is likewise not axiomatizable. This is done by showing that
if A is prenex, then there is a formula AG which is also prenex and which is valid in GV
iff Ag is. Note that not all quantifier shifting rules are generally valid in Go¨del logics,
so we have to show that for the particular case of formulas of the form of Ag, there is a
prenex formula which is valid in GV iff Ag is.
Theorem 54. If V is countably infinite, the prenex fragment of GV is not r.e.
Proof. By the proof of Theorem 36, a formula A is true in all finite models iff GV |= Ag.
Ag is of the form B → (A′∨∃uP(u)). We show that Ag is validity-equivalent in GV to
a prenex formula.
From Lemma 35 we see that each crisp formula is equivalent to a prenex formula;
let A0 be a prenex form of A′. Since all quantifier shifts for conjunctions are valid,
the antecedent B of Ag is equivalent to a prenex formula Q1x1 . . .QnxnB0(x1, . . . ,xn).
Hence, Ag is equivalent to QxB0(x)→ (A0∨∃uP(u)).
Let Q′i be ∃ if Qi is ∀, and ∀ if Qi is ∃, let C ≡ A0 ∨ ∃uP(u), and v =
I(∃uP(u))). We show that QxB0(x) → C is equivalent to Q
′
x(B0(x) → C) by in-
duction on n. Let QxB0 ≡ Q1x1 . . .QixiB1(d1, . . . ,di−1,xi). Since quantifier shifts
for ∃ in the antecent of a conditional are valid, we only have to consider the case
Qi = ∀. Suppose I(∀xi B1(d,xi)→C) 6= I(∃xi(B1(d,xi)→C). This can only happen
if I(∀xi B1(d,xi)) = I(C)< 1 but I(B1(d,c))> I(C)≥ v for all c. However, it is easy
to see by inspecting B that I(B1(d,c)) is either = 1 or ≤ v.
Now we show that I(B0(d)→ (A0 ∨∃uP(u))) = I(∃u(B0(d)→ (A0∨P(u)))). If
I(A0) = 1, then both sides equal = 1. If I(A0) = 0, then I(A0∨∃uP(u)) = v. The only
case where the two sides might differ is if I(B0(d)) = v but I(A0∨P(c)) = I(P(c))< v
for all c. But inspection of B0 shows that I(B0(t)) = 1 or = I(P(e)) for some e ∈ d
(the only subformulas of B0(d) which do not appear negated are of the form e′ ≺ e).
Hence, if I(B0(d)) = v, then for some e, I(P(e)) = v.
Last we consider the quantifiers in A0 ≡ QyA1. Since A0 is crisp, I(B0(d) →
(A0 ∨P(c))) = I(Qy(B0(d)→ (A1 ∨P(c)))) for all d, c. To see this, first note that
shifting quantifiers across ∨, and shifting universal quantifiers out of the consequent of
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a conditional is always possible. Hence it suffices to consider the case of ∃. I(∃yA2) is
either = 0 or = 1. In the former case, both sides equal I(B0(d)→ P(d)), in the latter,
both sides equal 1.
In summary, we obtain the following characterization of axiomatizability of prenex
fragments of Go¨del logics:
Theorem 55. The prenex fragment of GV is axiomatizable if and only if V is finite or
uncountable. The prenex fragments of any two GV where V is uncountable coincide.
6.2 ⊥-free fragments
In the following we will denote the ⊥-free fragment of GV with G 6⊥V . G
6⊥
V is the set of
all GV -valid formulas which do not contain ⊥ (and hence also no ¬). First we show
that the only candidates for r.e. fragments are the ⊥-free fragments of GV where V is
uncountable and either 0 ∈V ∞ or 0 is isolated V .
Lemma 56. If GV is not r.e., then G 6⊥V is also not r.e.
Define Ab as the formula obtained from A by replacing all occurences of⊥ with the
new propositional variable b (a 0-place predicate symbol). Then define A∗ as
A∗ =
( ∧
P∈A
∀x¯(b → P(x¯))
)
→ Ab
where P ∈ A means that P ranges over all predicate symbols occuring in A. We will
first prove a lemma relating A∗ and A:
Lemma 57.
GV |= A iff G 6⊥V |= A∗
Proof. If: Replace b by ⊥.
Only if: Suppose G 6⊥V 2 A∗. Thus, there is an interpretation I0 such that I0(A∗)< 1.
By Proposition 11 and Lemma 12, there is an interpretation I such that I(Ab)< 1 and
I((
∧
P∈A∀x¯(b → P(x¯)))) = 1. Because of the latter, for every atomic subformula B of
A, I(B)≥ I(b) = v. Define I′(B) for atomic subformulas B of A by
I′(B) =
{
0 I(B)≤ v
I(B) I(B)> v
(and arbitrary for other atomic formulas). It is easily seen by induction that I′(B) =
I(B) if I(B)> v, and if I(B) = v, then I′(B) = v or = 0. In particular, I′(Ab)< 1. But,
of course, I′(b) = I′(⊥) = 0, and hence I′(Ab) = I′(A).
Proof of Lemma 56. If G 6⊥V were recursively enumerable, then by Lemma 57, GV
would also be recursively enumerable.
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Thus, by Theorem 36, we only have two candidates for axiomatizable ⊥-free frag-
ments: both truth-value sets have a non-empty perfect kernel P, and in the one case
0 ∈ P and in the other 0 6∈ P but 0 is isolated. The prototypical Go¨del sets for these
cases are V1 = [0,1] and V2 = {0}∪ [1/2,1]. We will show that the ⊥-free fragments
of these two logics coincide, thus in fact proving that there is only one axiomatizable
⊥-free fragment.
Lemma 58. Let V1 = [0,1] and V2 = {0}∪ [1/2,1]. The ⊥-free fragments of GV1 and
GV2 coincide, i.e.
G 6⊥V1 |= A iff G
6⊥
V2 |= A
Proof. Only if: obvious, since a counter-example in V2 actually also is a counter-
example in V1.
If: Suppose that G 6⊥V1 2 A, i.e., there is an I1 such that I1(A)< 1. Define I2 for all
atomic subformulas B of A by I2(B) = 1/2(1+I1(B)). By Lemma 7 and the remark
following it we see that the definition of I2 extends to all formulas.
Theorem 59. The ⊥-free fragment of GV is recursively axiomatizable if and only if V
is finite or uncountable and either 0 belongs to V ∞ or is isolated. The ⊥-free fragment
of any two such V coincide.
Proof. From Lemma 56, Lemma 58 and Theorem 33 for the uncountable case. The
finite case is obvious as the additional axioms FIN(n) do not contain ⊥.
6.3 ∀-free fragments
In the following we will denote the ∃-fragment of GV with G∃V . It is the set of all
formulas valid in GV which do not contain ∀.
First we show, as in the case of the ⊥-free fragment, that the only candidates for
axiomatizable fragments are the two uncountable ones, 0 ∈ P and 0 isolated. We will
do this by showing that the formulas used to reduce validity in the other cases to Tra-
chtenbrodt’s Theorem are validity-equivalent to ∀-free formulas.
Lemma 60. If A(x) and B are ∀-free, then
|= ∀xA(x)→ B iff |= ∃x(A(x)→ B)
Proof. If: This is a valid quantifier shift rule.
Only if: Suppose that 2 ∃x(A(x)→ B), i.e., there is an interpretation I such that
I(∃x(A(x)→ B)< 1. But this implies that
∀u ∈U I(A(u))> I(B). (9)
Now define I′(Q) for atomic subformulas Q of A by
I
′(Q) =
{
I(Q) if I(Q)≤ I(B)
1 if I(Q)> I(B).
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Then (i) If C is ∀-free and I(C) > I(B), then I′(C) = 1, and if I(C) ≤ I(B), then
I′(C) = I(C); and (ii) I′(∀xA(x)) = 1
(i) For atomic C this is the definition of I′. The cases for ∧, ∨, and → are trivial.
Now let C≡∃xD(x). If I(∃xD(x))> I(B), then for some u∈UI, I(D(u))> I(B). By
induction hypthesis, I′(D(u)) = 1 and hence I′(∃xD(x)) = 1. Otherwise, I(∃xD(x))≤
I(B), in which case I′(D(u)) = I′(D(u)) for all u. (ii) By (9), for all u ∈U , I(A(u))>
I(B), hence, by (i), I′(A(u)) = 1.
By (i) and (ii) we have that I′(∀xA(x)) = 1 and I′(B) = I(B) < 1, thus
I′(∀xA(x)→ B)< 1, i.e., 2 ∀xA(x)→ B.
Note that in the preceding Lemma we can replace the prefix of A(x) by a string of
universal quantifiers and the same proof will work.
Lemma 61. If GV is not recursively enumerable, then also G∃V .
Proof. It is sufficient to show that Formula 7 for Ag as given on page 16 and Formula 8
for Ah as given on page 22 are validity-equivalent to ∀-free formulas.
If we only consider the quantifier structure of these formulas and apply valid quan-
tifier shifting rules, including the shifting rule for crisp formulas given in Lemma 35,
we obtain in both cases formulas which are of the form
∀x¯A(x¯)→ B
where A(x¯) and B are ∀-free. By to Lemma 60 we see that both formulas are validity
equivalent to ∀-free formulas.
As for the ⊥-free fragments, it turns out that the two prototypical examples of
Go¨del sets create the same ∃-fragment:
Lemma 62. Let V1 = [0,1] and V2 = {0}∪ [1/2,1]. The ∃-fragments of GV1 and GV2
coincide, i.e.
G∃V1 |= A iff G∃V2 |= A
Proof. Only if: obvious, since a counter-example in V2 actually also is a counter-
example in V1.
If: Suppose that G∃V1 2 A, i.e., there is an I1 such that I1(A) < 1. Define I2 for
all atomic subformulas B of A by I2(B) = 1/2(1+ I1(B)) if I1(B) > 0 and = 0 if
I1(Q) = 0. By Lemma 7 and the remark following it we see that the definition of I2
extends to all formulas.
Theorem 63. The ∃-fragment of GV is r.e. if and only if V is finite or uncountable and
either 0 belongs to V ∞ or is isolated. The ∃-fragment of any two such V coincide.
Proof. From Lemma 61, Lemma 62 and Theorem 33 for the uncountable case. The
finite case is obvious as the additional axioms FIN(n) do not contain universal quanti-
fiers.
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7 Conclusion
In the preceding sections, we have given a complete characterization of the r.e. and
non-r.e. first-order Go¨del logics. Our main result is that there are two distinct r.e.
infinite-valued Go¨del logics, viz., GR and G0. What we have not done, however,
is investigate how many non-r.e. Go¨del logics there are. It is known that there are
continuum-many different propositional consequence relations and continuum-many
different propositional quantified Go¨del logics [BV00]. In forthcoming work [BGP],
it is shown that there are only countably many first-order Go¨del logics. Although this
result goes some way to clarifying the situation, a criterion of identity of Go¨del log-
ics using some topological property of the underlying truth value set is a desideratum.
We have only given (Lemma 9) a sufficient condition: if there is a continuous bijection
between V and V ′, then GV =GV ′ . But this condition is not necessary: any pair of non-
isomorphic uncountable Go¨del sets with 0 contained in the perfect kernel provides a
quick counterexample (as any two such sets determine GR as their logic). Such a topo-
logical characterization of first-order infinite valued Go¨del logics could then be used to
obtain a more fine-grained analysis of the complexity of the non-r.e. Go¨del logics. As
noted already, these also differ in the degree to which they are non r.e. [Ha´j05].
Another avenue for future research would be to carry out the characterization of-
fered here for extensions of the language. Candidates for such extensions are the addi-
tion of the projection modalities (△a= 0 if a= 1 and = 1 if a< 1), of the globalization
operator of [TT86], or of the involutive negation (∼ a = 1− a). It is known that GR
with the addition of these operators is still axiomatizable. The presence of the pro-
jection modality, in particular, disturbs many of the nice features we have been able
to exploit in this paper, for instance, in the presence of △ the crucial Lemma 12 and
Proposition 13 no longer hold. Thus, not all of our results go through for the extended
language and new methods will have to be developed.
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